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Broman (89) analyzes the mixed Nash equilibria of the split-the-difference mechanism over
countable sets. She leaves as an open question whether there may be mixed equilibria over
uncountable sets with singular parts. In this note, I propose such an equilibrium; the support
of the strategies is the union of a countable set and an interval.
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URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2007/volume3/EB-07C70018A.pdfThe double auction is an important model that stylizes one-shot simultaneous bargaining be-
tween two agents; it was introduced by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) who show that double
auctions with asymmetric information will typically display inefﬁciencies1. Broman (1989) de-
rives a striking result. She shows that there are many inefﬁcient Nash equilibria in the complete
information double auction, just like in the case of asymmetric information. She also argues that
there may be no equilibrium such that the mixed strategies of both agents will have an absolutely
continuous part2 (unlike in most models of asymmetric information). In this note, I will show that
one can obtain an equilibrium where both agents follow a distribution that includes mass points
and a simple absolutely continuous part.
Consider the following game. A buyer may purchase an indivisible item from a seller. If the
item is purchased, the buyer achieves a utility of one minus the monetary transfer and the seller
obtains the monetary transfer. If the item is not purchased, both traders achieve a utility normalized
to zero. The double auction (or split-the-difference) mechanism proceeds as follows. The buyer
and the seller simultaneously submit an offer, denoted ‘bid’, v, for the buyer and ‘ask’, c, for the
seller. If the ask is strictly above the bid, trade fails and both traders obtain zero. If the ask is below
the bid, trade occurs. The monetary transfer, τvc, is the average of both prices: (v + c)/2.
Proposition 1 (Broman 89, Proposition 6) Let p be a probability density function on [0,1] which
can be decomposed into p1, an absolutely continuous function, and p2, a probability mass function
deﬁned on a set {ai} (i.e. a step function). Then, there is no equilibrium in which the buyer plays
p as a mixed strategy.
Bertomeu and Cheynel (2007) show that this statement is incorrect: there are equilibria such
that the support of p is a closed interval. When intervals are excluded, this note will show that if
the assumption that p2 is a step function is relaxed in Proposition 6, so that p is probability density
function whose support is the union of an uncountable set (an interval) and a countable set, one
can ﬁnd a mixed equilibrium.
Deﬁne Fv (resp. Fc), the distribution of the buyer (resp. seller). Let Γ denote the Gamma
function and csc denote the cosecant function.
1The authors claim that asymmetric information, in contrast to complete information, accounts for inefﬁciencies
in trade: (p.836) “the complete information approach fails to mirror key features of actual negotiations: (...) the
occurrence of ’unreasonable’ bargaining outcomes-breakdowns in negotiations, strikes, and work stoppages-when
mutually beneﬁcial agreements are possible.”
2“It is an open question whether or not there are equilibria which have mixed strategies (over uncountable sets)
with singular parts. It seems likely that none exist and even more likely that, if they did, no player would ever think of
playing such a strategy” (p.141-142).
1For all i ∈ N − {0} and for all x ∈ [1/3 − 1/(i + 3),1/3 − 1/(i + 4)),
















For all x ∈ [1/3,2/3),










For all i ∈ N − {0,1} and for all x ∈ [2/3 + 1/(i + 3),2/3 + 1/(i + 2)),













21−2i(35 + 24i + 4i2)Γ(4 + 2i)
(3)
And ﬁnally:
Fv(11/12) = 1 and Fc(1/12) = 1 − Fv(13/15) (4)
Equations (1)-(4) correspond to a Nash equilibrium with possibly uncountable support (see Ap-


















Figure 1: CDF of Proposal: Buyer (Solid) and Seller (Dashed)
There are several reasons why equilibria of this form may matter for the analysis of mixed
strategies in the complete information double auction. First, as the example shows, the additional
complexityoftheequilibriumdoesnotoriginatefromthestrategythatischosenontheuncountable
subset of the support (i.e. on the interval), but rather from the coordination of the players on
the countable part. Therefore, a mixed strategy with an absolutely continuous part is not less
2reasonable than a mixed strategy with a countably inﬁnite support3. Second, a probability density
function that satisﬁes the conditions Proposition 6 may be made to approximate the equilibrium
as closely as desired, just by truncating the countable part of the support. Third, the construction
proposed in Equations (1)-(4) is obtained by taking the limit of equilibrium strategies with a ﬁnite
support, for which a closed-form expression exists4.
Appendix:
I shall prove here that Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) are such that the buyer is indifferent to any value in
{1/3−1/(3+i)}∞
i=1∪[1/3,2/3]∪{2/3+1/(3+i)}∞
i=1; the indifference of the seller follows by symmetry.
Clearly, any value outside of this range cannot be optimal. Along the proof, C and C will refer to functions
of i whose expression is omitted for notational simplicity.
Consider ﬁrst values in the set {1/3 − 1/(3 + i)}∞
i=1. Denote ∆(i), the difference between the expected
proﬁt achieved by playing 1/3 − 1/(3 + i) minus the expected proﬁt achieved by playing 1/3 − 1/(4 + i).
∆(i) = −(Fc(1/3−1/(4+i))−Fc(1/3−1/(3+i)))(2/3+1/(4+i))+Fc(1/3+1/(3+i))(1/(3+i)−1/(4+i))
Substituting the strategy from Equation (3) and simplifying yields:
∆(i) = C(

















The term on the right-hand side is readily veriﬁed to be zero. Note also that the buyer must be indifferent
to a sequence of values converging to 1/3 and Fc is continuous at 1/3, therefore playing 1/3 yields the same
proﬁt as any value in {1/3 − 1/(3 + i)}∞
i=1.




(1 − u/2 − x/2)dFc(u)
Since Fs admits a density on the interval, Π(x) can be differentiated:
Π0(x) = F0
c(x)(1 − x) − Fc(x)/2
Substituting the distribution F0
c yields that Π0(x) is zero.
3Such strategies are the focus of Propositions 2, 3 and 4, p.139).
4See Proposition 1 in Broman (1989)
3Finally, denote ∆(i), the difference between the expected proﬁt achieved by playing 2/3 + 1/(4 + i)
minus the expected proﬁt achieved by playing 2/3 + 1/(3 + i). Similar arguments as before yield:
∆(i) = C(
−(2i2 + 8i + 3)Γ(2 −
q
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Again, the right-hand side term is veriﬁed to be zero.
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